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Stern: The Changing Face of Judicial Elections

THE CHANGING FACE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
Gerald Stern*

FREE SPEECH IN JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS AND AN IMPARTIAL JUDICIARY:
A CLASH OF VALUES

CONTROLLING CAMPAIGN SPEECH

Judges are elected in thirty-nine states under rules that govern their
campaign conduct.' In New York, as in other states, judicial candidates
may not make campaign pledges or promises to the electorate as to how
they would decide matters if elected.2 Nor may they make commitments
(or appear to do so) on issues likely to come before the court 3 or
"knowingly make any false statement or misrepresent the identity,
qualifications, current position or other fact concerning [either] the
candidate or an opponent. ' 4 Judicial candidates are also instructed to
"maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office and act in a manner
consistent with the integrity and independence of the judiciary. 5 And
since judges must "act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary," 6 that
* Special Counsel to the Judicial Institute of the New York State Unified Court System and
former Administrator, New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, 1974-2003.
1. See ABA, American Bar Association Fact Sheet on Judicial Selection Methods in the
States, available at http://www.manningproductions.com/ABA263/FactSheet.htm (last visited Sept.
4, 2004).
2. See Rules Of The Chief Administrator Of The Courts [hereinafter N.Y. Rules], N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 100.5(A)(4)(d)(i) (2001). The origin of the rules is the American
Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which has been recommended to the states. For
purposes of consistency, reference in this article will be to "rules." Most states have adopted the
ABA's Model Code or variations of particular canons in the Code. In New York, the applicable
sections are referred to as "rules."
3. See id. § 100.5(A)(4)(d)(ii).
4. Id. § 100.5(A)(4)(d)(iii).
5. Id. § 100.5(A)(4)(a).
6. Id. § 100.2(A).
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provision too has been used to enforce high standards
during campaigns.
7
activity.
political
candidates'
restrict
Other rules
Generally, judicial candidates have conducted their campaigns in
line with these rules. Typically, the campaign literature of judicial
candidates presents their experience and qualifications without any
mention of the candidates' opinions about legal or political issues of
interest to voters. Endorsements are listed, including those of right-tolife or pro-choice groups and police unions, which suggest the possible
leanings of the candidates. In New York, when judicial candidates
occasionally implied how they would decide particular types of casesusually criminal cases-the Commission on Judicial Conduct, beginning
in the mid-1990s, took disciplinary action under the existing rules. 8
Restrictions on judicial candidates, when they are followed, make
for dull campaigns, and critics of existing restrictions argue that voters
have no way of distinguishing among candidates, and candidates have
no effective way of distinguishing themselves from their competitors.
There is logic to the view that elections contemplate rigorous debate and
campaign promises, and when the candidates are muzzled, elections are
a farce. But there is a price to pay when judicial candidates engage in
typical campaign conduct.

7. See id. § 100.5(A)(1), (2), (5).
8. See In re Hafner, N.Y. COMM'N ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT ANNUAL REPORT [hereinafter
N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP.] 113 (2001) (Admonition) (Candidate ran a print ad that asked voters
whether they were "tired of seeing criminals get a 'slap' on the wrist," and then said, "So am ."; he
also approved an ad by the Conservative Party Chair that attacked his opponent's record of
dismissing cases; the ad said: "Soft judges make hard criminals!"); In re Herrick, N.Y. COMM'N
ANN. REP. 103, 103-04 (1999) (Admonition) (Candidate told voters in a televised ad that that they
needed to know what judges would "be like when they put the robe on," and stated that when
defendants come before him who violated orders of protection, he would send them to jail. One
Commission finding was that matters concerning orders of protection would rarely come before him
in the court of general jurisdiction.); In re Maislin, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 113, 113-14 (1999)
(Admonition) (Candidate spoke to a reporter about two cases that had been remanded to him from a
higher court and stated that he stood by his original ruling. He ran campaign ads that purported to
show tough action in criminal cases and assured voters that he would send criminals to jail. He used
as his campaign slogan: "Do The Crime-Do The Time."); In re Polito, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP.
129, 129-30 (1999) (Admonition) (Candidate ran TV ads that stated: "Violent crime in our streets"
and portrayed a masked man attacking a woman outside her car; the ad urged voters to vote for him
and "crack down on crime." A second ad assured voters that he would stop the "revolving door of
justice" and that he would not "experiment with alternative sentences" or "send convicted child
molesters home for the weekend").
In addition to being published in annual reports, the determinations of the N.Y. State
Commission on Judicial Conduct are also available on the Commission's website at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us.
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The question is whether there is sufficient justification for the
traditional restrictions on judicial campaigns. Should voters know how
judicial candidates stand on the "hot-button," national issues of the day:
whether they are opposed to gun control, abortion, same-sex marriages,
and equal treatment of homosexuals; whether they would be "tough" on
defendants charged with, and, possibly, convicted of, crimes; and
whether they would be more sympathetic to landlords or tenants?9
The argument in support of the restrictions is that, unlike other
public officials, judges play a unique role in deciding issues of fact and
law, based on principles of established law. They are not the public's
representatives in the political sense. They do not have-or should not
have--constituencies. For the justice system to work, judges must know
and apply the law, be impartial, .and be perceived to be such. Judges
should not decide cases based on what a majority of the public wants to
have happen. All parties in civil and criminal proceedings should be
assured of a fair hearing by an independent and impartial judge, and
when judges have already committed themselves on issues that come
before them, the parties on the "wrong" side of the issues cannot be
confident that they will receive fair hearings. Moreover, when a judge
has given assurances on specific issues to voters, is elected, and then
presides over a matter that the judge has addressed, the judge's
subsequent ruling could reasonably raise the question whether the judge
was biased.
Judges who campaign against crime portray a favorable image to
most voters, but not to the defendants who subsequently appear before
them. If a judge has assured voters that she will be "tough" on criminals,
it is unlikely that a defendant in a criminal proceeding will be assured
that his rights will be protected, including the right to a fair trial and the
right to appear before an independent and impartial judge. Furthermore,
when a judicial candidate gives even vague assurances to voters that he
or she will favor the prosecution, the candidate's opponents may be
pressured to do the same, and the competition among candidates to show
which one is the real "law and order" candidate is apt to generate more
specific assurances. And the same holds true for other matters of great
9. There are also local issues that voters might want judicial candidates to address. Are the
judicial candidates for or against placing in communities unpopular group homes that the public
fears would adversely affect their safety, comfort and property values? What are the candidates'
views on the controversial development of property by large businesses? Do they favor
neighborhood preservation or real estate development? The fact that some of these local disputes
may be litigated is all the more reason why the voters might want to know how candidates for
judicial office feel about these issues.
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interest to the public; in a large urban area, such as New York City,
where most residents are apartment dwellers, landlords may be regarded
only slightly better than defendants in criminal cases; and a clever
candidate for civil court might be tempted to appeal to a large voting
bloc that might select a judge who identified with tenants. 10
In a 1980 campaign for Civil Court of the City of New York, three
candidates for the Democratic Party nomination, which in New York
City would assure victory in the general election, distributed a joint
campaign circular, the front page of which read:
Ifyou were in court with your landlord..
or a company that cheatedyou...
Ifyou were hit by a car.

..

or a mugger...

What kind ofjudge would you want?1
(Ellipses in original.)
In that campaign literature, landlords are listed first among other
undesirable minorities: a company that cheats, a driver of a car that hits a
pedestrian, and a mugger. The three candidates are portrayed in the
literature as the kind of judges whom tenants and others who have been
cheated, hit, or mugged should want. Implicit in the literature is that
these candidates would make a difference as judges in the situations
presented.' 2 Of the reasons why such campaigns are inconsistent with a
judge's duty to uphold the integrity, impartiality, and independence of
the judiciary, one is that judicial candidates who appeal to voters'
concerns and prejudices may then feel some compulsion to become the

10. See In re Birnbaum, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 73 (1998) (Censure) (Candidate for N.Y.C.
Civil Court identified himself as a "tenant" and his opponent as a "landlord" in a brochure, in which
he included statements of support that he had solicited from tenants in cases before him, including
one case pending at the time).
11. No action was taken in New York against any judges for questionable campaign slogans
until the mid-1990s. The prevailing view until that time was that elections give rise to these
indiscretions, and campaign rhetoric was regarded as a tolerable price to pay for elections.
12. Disqualification in particular cases would not be an adequate remedy for a judge's biased
views aired during the campaign for judicial office. Disqualification, which shifts a difficult,
awkward and expensive burden to parties, would be of little practical use where the judge has taken

a position on an entire class of parties who appear regularly before the courts, such as defendants in
criminal cases or landlords in civil cases. Moreover, most lawyers are reluctant to ask judges to
disqualify themselves for bias.
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judge they told voters they would be. 13 Incumbent judges would be
particularly vulnerable in elections in which their opponents accused
them of being "soft on crime," "soft" on landlords, "soft" on gay rights,
or "soft" on whatever class of parties is currently in disfavor. They
would be vulnerable to attack even if the criticized rulings were
consistent with law.
Voters are apt to elect chief executives and legislators who promise
to be tough on those parties for whom the public has no sympathy. That
is democracy at work. The courts should be different, in part because the
courts must determine whether the political decisions of governors,
mayors, and legislators are consistent with constitutional and statutory
law, and because a judge who has promised to be "tough" on defendants
in criminal cases really should do what the circumstances call for, which
sometimes means being "tough" and at other times means being lenient,
but at all times means safeguarding the rights of accused defendants. It is
elementary that basic, well-established rights are not subject to what a
majority of voters want, and a judge's loyalty must be to the law and to
abiding by high court interpretations of the law, not to the wishes of
voters. 14
13. Not everyone would agree with this point. One writer expressed a contrary view in a
recent law review article. The writer states:
The expansion of First Amendment rights could be a double-edged sword for judicial
candidates. While candidates will now be able to voice their opinions on more issues,
nothing guarantees that doing so will better their chances of election. Voters are certainly
intelligent enough to realize that impartiality is a desirable quality in a judge, and they
may turn away from candidates whose behavior suggests that they have prejudged
important legal issues. In addition, candidates who announce their views on "hot" legal
issues risk having political groups actively opposing their candidacy based on their
controversial views.
Jacob McCrea, The FirstAmendment Allows a Candidatefor Judicial Election to Announce His or
Her Views on DisputedLegal or PoliticalIssues: Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 41 DUQ.
L. REV. 425, 444-45 (2003). At times, that would be true, in which case the candidate's strategy was
poor. Undoubtedly, a carefully selected slogan or description of the candidate such as "law and
order" in many areas of the country could do wonders for a challenger's campaign at minimal risk
that the good-government groups, defense bar or defendants themselves will rise up in protest. And
contrary to the view that the call to retain restrictions shows lack of faith in voters, see Stephen
Gillers, Let Judicial Candidates Speak, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2002, at A31, the issue does not
concern faith in voters. Offensive campaigns in recent years, in which candidates gave assurances to
the electorate that they would favor the police and prosecution viewpoint, have been successful.
Trusting the judgment of voters on matters they care about is not an appropriate safeguard in
dealing with the danger to due process of law. Mr. Gillers, one of the leading experts on legal and
judicial ethics, would allow candidates to offer general discussions of legal issues, but not promises
of particular rulings. See id. The big gap in the middle should be of concern.
14. See generally, Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial
Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059 (1996). In his excellent article, Justice Shepard urges that it is
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Finally, there are proponents of expanded speech rights who state
that because the states have chosen to elect judges, the voters have a
right to hear the views of those who run for political office and the
candidates have an inherent right to speak freely to the voters.' 5 This
point of view does not necessarily support the election of judges. United
States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor condemns the
election of judges, but believes that when candidates are selected by
elections, they should have the same right to campaign as candidates do
16
for other public offices.
While there is merit to that position, the countervailing view is that
in judicial elections, preserving due process of law and an impartial
judiciary is more important than letting candidates appeal for votes in
any manner they see fit, and, most importantly, that judicial elections are
possible only if candidates' speech is regulated.17
This article will examine whether judicial candidates have a First
Amendment right to address issues in their campaigns for votes, and, if
so, what they are permitted to say. It will also examine whether
candidates' political conduct can be regulated more closely in judicial
elections. Some court challenges to existing rules have been successful
over the past decade, and, recently, the United States Supreme Court in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White 8 struck down a Minnesota rule
that prohibited judicial candidates from announcing positions on
disputed legal or political issues. The decision in White is apt to have a
profound effect on what candidates will say to voters and what voters
may demand from candidates during judicial elections. White also raises
the question whether it will be applied beyond announcing positions on
disputed issues. Post- White decisions have begun to address free speech
9
issues beyond the one covered by the court in White.'

a mistake to simply weigh the right to speak to voters against "generic state interests as the
appearance of impartiality and the dignity of the legal profession." Id. at 1090. The courts, he states,
should give "adequate weight to the constitutional interests of present and future litigants to due

process of law." Id.
15.
16.

See, e.g., Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (1 th Cir. 2002).
See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788-89 (2002) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring).
17.
18.
19.

See Shepard, supra note 14, at 1090-91.
536 U.S. 765 (2002).
See, e.g., Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d (N.D.N.Y.

2003) (addressing partisan political activity in judicial campaigns and First Amendment
ramifications), rev'd on other grounds, 351 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 2003).
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PROHIBITED POLITICAL ACTIVITY

In New York, as in other states, the rules governing judicial
conduct prohibit political activity of all kinds, except during a defined
window period, when candidates are permitted to engage in some
political activity in their campaigns for judicial office. 20 So, for example,
judges may not attend political functions, except for a period of nine
months before any election or primary or nominating convention, which
would be a necessary part of running for office, and six months after an
election. 2 ' Judicial candidates in New York may not speak at political
fundraisers for other candidates or political parties or clubs or solicit
funds for any campaigns, including their own. 22 In short, they are
prohibited from engaging in many political activities that are an integral
part of running for office.23 As candidates, they can appoint committees
of responsible persons to raise funds, but the candidates cannot
participate in direct solicitation of funds.2 4
Restrictions on political activities obviously portray a belief that
being a judge does not mix with partisan 'politics. The rules in New York
are strictly enforced. For example, judges have been advised that they
may not attend a political debate if it is sponsored by a political
25
organization.
One judge was publicly admonished for attending
political functions despite his claim that he was present 26either to
accompany or pick up his wife who was active in local politics.
Fifteen years before the White decision, a town justice was removed
from office for doing no more than candidates for other public offices do
routinely. In In re Maney, 27 a town justice, in preparation for his
campaign for re-election nearly eighteen months before his re-election
campaign was to start, met with supporters, and planned strategy to
replace his party's political leader, who had no intention of supporting

20. See N.Y. Rules § 100.5(A)(2) (2001).
21. See id. §§ 100.5(A)(2), 100.0(Q).
22. See id. § l00.5(A)(l)(e)-(h).
23. See id. § 100.5(A)(1), (2).
24. See id. § 100.5(A)(5).
25. See N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 90-177 (1990).
26. See In re Rath, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 150, 151-52 (1990) (Admonition). Other judges
have been publicly disciplined in New York for attending political meetings or engaging in political
activities. See In re Crnkovich, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 99 (2003) (Censure) (Town court justice
endorsed a candidate for another judicial office); In re Gloss, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 81 (1989)
(Censure) (Town court justice attended political meetings and helped raise funds).
27. 510 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1987).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 18

1514

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:1507

Judge Maney for re-election. 28 Judge Maney knew that his actions were
contrary to the rules, which barred political activity, but explained that
unless he took steps to defeat the party leader in a caucus arranged by
the judge, he would not get the party's endorsement that he needed to
run again. 29 The judge acknowledged his conduct, admitted that it was
improper, and asked not to be removed. 30 The Commission staff
recommended a censure; the Commission rejected the recommendation
and determined that the judge should be removed; on review by the New
York State Court of Appeals, the court accepted the Commission's
3
determination. 1
Although the content of candidates' speech is an issue that has
attracted most of the First Amendment attention, the decision in White
has spurred claims that candidates for election as judges cannot
constitutionally be prevented from engaging in other kinds of political
activity. One federal appellate court stated that the typical restriction
against judicial candidates soliciting funds contravenes their First
Amendment right in the light of the recent decision in White.32 That
court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
interpreted White to mean that in all respects "the standard for judicial
elections should be the same as the standard for legislative and executive
elections. 33 Obviously, that rationale renders the special rules on
judicial campaign conduct to be unenforceable, and if that becomes the
norm, judicial campaign practices would be markedly changed.
Whether the courts, in addition to the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, will interpret the First Amendment to permit judicial
candidates to engage fully in normal political activity, such as raising
funds, supporting other candidates, and, generally, becoming part of the
political party process, is yet to be seen. In New York, a candidate's
recent attempt to assert a First Amendment defense against charges that
he engaged in prohibited political activity-of the kind that would be
acceptable for candidates for other public offices-was rebuffed.34

28. Seeid. at312.
29. Seeid.at313.
30. See In re Maney, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. (1987)
31. See Maney, 510 N.E.2d. at 312.
32. See Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2002).
33. Id. at 1321. The Supreme Court in White did not assert that position, and specifically
stated that it was not doing so. See White, 536 U.S. at 783.
34. See In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287 (N.Y. 2003).
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CHALLENGES To THE ESTABLISHED ORDER

Over the past decade constitutional challenges have been brought
against various rules governing judicial campaigns. Courts have struck
down some of the standard rules,35 while other courts have upheld
them.36 The provision against making statements that commit or appear
to commit the candidate with respect to matters that are likely to come
before the court has been upheld. 3' The Illinois provision against making
pledges or promises of conduct in office has been struck down by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals since it does not on its face limit the
prohibition to pledges or promises to rule a certain way in particular
38

cases.

In 1988, the Supreme Court of Washington held that a judge's
campaign statements that he is a "tough, no-nonsense judge" were
permissible since such slogans "suggest nothing more than a strict
application of the law and do not single out any particular party for
special treatment., 39 The same court in the same case held that the more
specific pledge, "TOUGH ON DRUNK DRIVING," violated the rule
against making a pledge or promise.40 But the court refused to uphold a
charge that the candidate had used false, misleading or deceptive
campaign advertising in stating in campaign ads that a majority of his
opponent's support came from "drunk driving defense attoneys. '41 The
justification for the campaign claim was that of the attorneys who had
contributed a total of $7,944, those who either had represented a DWI
defendant or said they would if requested to do so had contributed a total
of $4,001 .42 The court held that although the campaign speech violated
the canon, it was constitutionally protected.4 3

35. See Buckley v. I11.Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993); Beshear v. Butt,
863 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Ark. 1994); A.C.L.U. v. Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094 (N.D. Fla. 1990);
J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1991).

36. See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001), rev'd sub nom.
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd, of the
Supreme Court of Pa., 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991).
37. See Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Ret. and Review Comm'n, 776 F. Supp. 309, 314-15 (W.D.
Ky. 1991); Deters v. Judicial Ret. and Removal Comm'n, 873 S.W.2d 200 (Ky. 1994) (running as a
"Pro-Life Candidate").
38. See Buckley, 997 F.2d at 228-29.
39. See In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392, 396 (Wash. 1988).
40. See id. at 395-96.
41. See id. at 397.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 397, 399.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 18

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 32:1507

In In re Chmura, 4 the Supreme Court of Michigan rejected the
Michigan judicial conduct commission's conclusions that a judge's
campaign claims had been improper and reasoned that it had no
"competence" to pass upon "the seemliness" of campaign rhetoric.45 The
court held that "[s]peech that can reasonably be interpreted as
communicating 'rhetorical hyperbole,' 'parody,' or 'vigorous epithet' is
constitutionally protected., 46 The Michigan Supreme Court in Chmura,
the canon
applying an "exacting scrutiny" analysis 47-because
potentially authorized discipline based on the contents of a candidate's
speech-held that the Michigan standards were too broad and that
controls on political speech 48 in judicial campaigns must be as limited
and as clear as existing standards for defamation against public
officials. 49 The Michigan Commission had to prove that the
communications involved objectively factual matters, and if inaccurate,
the communication-to be subject to discipline-would have to be

44. 626 N.W.2d 876 (Mich. 2001).
45. Id. at 887. Why would the high court of a state not have competence to pass upon the
unseemliness of judicial campaign conduct in Michigan, apart from whether the conduct is
protected by the First Amendment? If the conduct were not protected by the First Amendment, the
Supreme Court of Michigan, the state's highest court, would be in a unique and excellent position to
deter unseemly conduct, just as it does with regard to the conduct ofjudges generally.
46. Id. at 886.
47. Id. at 882. For the contents of speech in campaign flyers and the like, the test is whether
the restrictions are narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest. There should be
no doubt that there is a compelling state interest that the Code and rules seek to protect. As Justice
Stewart stated in his concurring opinion in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S.
829 (1978): "There is hardly.., a higher governmental interest than a State's interest in the quality
of its judiciary." Id. at 848.
48. See Chmura, 626 N.W.2d at 882. The court noted:
Political speech is "'at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment
freedoms' ... an area of public policy where protection of robust discussion is at its
zenith." Because the central purpose of the First Amendment speech clause is to protect
core political speech, we determined that political speech may not be regulated in the
same manner that commercial speech is regulated.
Id. at 882 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988)).
49. See id. at 885. "Thus, we examine defamation case law for guidance in analyzing whether
a judicial candidate knowingly, or with reckless disregard, has used or participated in the use of any
form of public communication that is false." Id. The Michigan rule barred
the use of any form of public communication that the candidate knows or reasonably
should know is false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or which contains a material
misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make the statement
considered as a whole not materially misleading, or which is likely to create an
unjustified expectation about results the candidate can achieve.
MICH. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(I )(d) (1994).
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shown by the Commission to be false and made with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of the truth.5 °
Judge Chmura's campaign literature portrayed himself as a fiscally
conservative lawyer who participated in anti-taxation causes, a tough
judge who took "one criminal after another off our streets," '5' and who
prevented the former mayor of Detroit from stealing state tax revenues
for use in Detroit schools; 52 in fact, the use of those funds had been in
line with state law and there was no indication that the former mayor
supported the criticized use of tax revenue.53
Judge Chmura had criticized his opponent for the lenient sentences
and bail decisions of a court where the opponent had served as a nonjudge, court administrator and magistrate.5 4 Chmura's campaign
literature described his opponent, Jim Conrad, as "in charge" of the
court,55 which impliedly made him responsible for all controversial
decisions of the judges of that court. Another reference to the opponent's
connection to that court was the statement that it was "Jim Conrad's
Court., 56 These claims clearly misrepresented Conrad's responsibility as
a court administrator, although the Michigan Supreme Court apparently
regarded them as fair campaign commentary. Judge Chmura also made
references to a claim that his opponent had sexually harassed a woman,

50. See Chmura, 626 N.W.2d at 896-97. If the candidate's material statements about an
opponent were false, the Commission should have an adequate basis to investigate. If the false
statements were de minimis, there would be no basis to act. The absence of a good reason why the
candidate published false information would seem to justify discipline, which could be private or
public depending on the circumstances. That such statements were made with knowledge that they
were false is often difficult to establish. It is understandable that errors may be made in a campaign,
and a candidate should not be disciplined for every error made. But serious or vicious misstatements
should be subject to discipline, and the degree to which the candidate made the false statements,
either knowing that they were false or acting with reckless disregard of the truth, should be a matter
for the extent of the discipline. The burden should shift to the speaker or writer of the false
statement to establish that it was an inadvertent error, and if that defense were successful, it would
constitute a strong mitigating factor in the disciplinary proceeding.
5 1. Id. at 888. If taking "one criminal after another off the streets" is acceptable campaign
rhetoric in the future, how will it be possible to have an unbiased judiciary in criminal cases? For a
judge to campaign on such a record is not only "unseemly," it is improper. If that is the standard in
Michigan, it follows that judicial candidates will boast about how tough on criminals they have been
and that should be a substantial boost to their bid to be reelected.
52. See id
53. The political speech is set forth in part in "Exhibit I" in the court's decision. See id.
54. See id. at 891-92. The court stated that although the statements could be construed as
implying that the opponent as a court administrator had responsibility for sentencing and setting
bail, the statements were not clearly false since the opponent was part of the court. Id.
55. Id. at 895.
56. Id. at 892.
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but in doing so used a photograph and drawing that might reasonably be
regarded as unfair. 7 Arguably, Judge Chmura had an obligation to note
that a court had dismissed most aspects of the sexual harassment claim
against his opponent and that no court or other forum had sustained any
part of the claim, but the decision of the supreme court, in applying libel
standards, held that Judge Chmura's statements were protectedf 8
Also, pre-White, a United States District Court struck down a
Nevada code provision that required a judicial candidate to "'maintain
the dignity appropriate to judicial office and act in a manner consistent
with the integrity and independence of the judiciary."' 5 9 This uniform
disciplinary rule is perhaps the most vulnerable to constitutional attack if
each standard is separately scrutinized.60 One of the campaign ads
considered by the court referred to the offending candidate's opponent as
a special public defender [who] has spent much of his career trying to
keep criminals out of jail! How can he possibly understand the agony
victims of violent crime feel when the person accused of hurting them
or their loved6 1 ones is set free because of legal maneuvering or drafty
[sic] tactics?

The candidate who had placed the ad added to this attack on his
opponent with a television commercial that "depicts supposed criminals
cheering at the fact that [his opponent] may become a judge., 62 The
district court held that Canon 5A(3)(a) of the Nevada Code of Judicial
Conduct was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to give notice of
the type of speech that would be unprotected.6 3

57. See id. at 893.
58. See id at 895.
59.

Mahan v. Judicial Ethics and Election Practices Commn',

No. CV-S-98-01663-DAE,

2000 WL 33937547, at *5 (D. Nev. Mar. 23, 2000). In the same opinion, the court upheld the
constitutionality of another provision that restricted candidates for judicial office from knowingly
misrepresenting the identity, qualifications, present position or other fact concerning the candidate
or an opponent. See id. at *3-*5.

60. Many states have the same rule in force, but its constitutionality is in great doubt. This
rule could better survive close analysis when it is joined by the "pledges and promises" rule,
assuming the candidate's campaign rhetoric constitutes a pledge or promise; if not, as in Nevada, it
probably would be difficult to uphold the constitutionality of the requirement to maintain the dignity

appropriate to judicial office.
61.

Mahan, 2000 WL 33937547, at *1.

62. Id. at *2.
63. See id. at *8.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss4/18

12

Stern: The Changing Face of Judicial Elections

2004]

CHANGING FACE OFJUDICIAL ELECTIONS

1519

REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari after the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the Minnesota
"announce" clause, which prohibited judicial candidates from
announcing positions on legal or disputed issues. 64 In a 5-4 decision, the
United States Supreme Court reversed.6 5 Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia concluded that there were only three possible interests that
could be served by the rule: (1) impartiality in the sense of promoting
openmindedness, 66 (2) impartiality in the sense of being free of any
preconceived ideas on issues, 67 and (3) impartiality in the sense of
lacking bias against parties. 68 Justice Scalia reasoned that because the
"announce" clause restricts speech only with respect to issues, and since
judges do not become partial or biased by taking positions on issues in
their adjudications, the "announce" clause by its very form is not
narrowly tailored to serve impartiality in its traditional sense-lack of
bias for or against a party.69 The majority limited its holding to the
"announce" clause, which restricts a candidate for judicial office from
announcing "his or her views on disputed legal or political issues. ' 70 The
Court took no position on the rule prohibiting "pledges or promises. 71
Distinguishing between announcing views on issues and making a
pledge or promise, Justice Scalia observed that announcing views
"covers much more than promising to decide an issue a particular way.
The prohibition extends to the candidate's mere statement of his current
position, even if he does not bind himself to maintain that position after
election. 72
Justice Scalia observed that although the "announce" clause would
prevent the discussion of certain issues that reflect bias against a party, it
is too broad because it would also include speech on issues that do not
reflect such bias.73 In support of the view that that there is no compelling
State interest in prohibiting judges from expressing their views on the
law (i.e. issues), Justice Scalia observed that judges often express their
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 770 (2002).
See id. at 788.
See id.
at 778.
See id at 777.
See id at 775.
See id. at 776.
See id
See id. at 770.
Id. (emphasis in original).
See id. at 776-77.
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views of the law,
and may already be regarded as having fixed views on
74
certain

issues.

There appears to be a big difference between a judge who has
earned a reputation based on the judge's rulings and a judicial candidate
who announces his or her position on legal or disputed legal issues,
particularly when those issues relate to parties who may eventually be
asserting those issues in court. Of course, lawyers who practice criminal
law usually know which judges are "tough" and which are lenient, just
as lawyers who practice in specialized areas of civil law can identify
judges who favor plaintiffs and those who favor defendants. But these
informal ratings based on how judges handle cases in court do not justify
biased campaign statements relating to parties who might come before
the candidates. At stake are the important principles of due process of
law and the impartiality of the judiciary.
Campaign promises are also different from judicial statements of
law because they offer a pact with the voters. Many of the candidates
who assert positions on the law appear to be addressing crime because it
is a subject of some concern among voters. At least implicitly the
candidate says, "Vote for me because I will take the prosecutor's side in
criminal cases." 75 But not all messages to voters are that blunt, and, thus,
it is not always easy to establish that the candidate made a pledge or
promise. At what point does a personal philosophy become a candidate's
pledge or promise to act in a certain manner? When political literature
describes a candidate as believing in "law and order," for example, there
may be a biased message being sent to voters. The "law and order
candidate" seems to be saying, "Vote for me and I will be a 'law and
order' judge," which is different from a judge who is regarded as a "law
and order" judge because of prior judicial decisions. The "law and
order" candidate can avoid a disciplinary sanction today, at least in New
York, because a recent decision by New York's highest court held that
the term did not constitute a pledge or promise. 76
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in White expressed concern
about statements made that would pose a special threat to
"openmindedness because the candidate, when elected judge, will have a

74. See id. at 779.
75. Apparently no candidate has assured the public that if elected he or she would take the
defendant's side, but if that happened, it would also be improper, and undoubtedly police and

prosecutors would not stand for it.
76.

See In re Shanley, 774 N.E.2d 735, 737 (N.Y. 2002).
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particularreluctance to contradict them., 77 Justice Scalia conceded that
Justice Stevens' concern "might be plausible" and that might support 78a
rule against campaign promises, "which is not challenged here."
Justice Stevens' concern might also support a rule against biased
references to potential parties where the candidate has not made a pledge
or promise.
So it is clear that a rule against announcing positions on disputed
legal or political issues is too broad to enforce, in part because it would
chill announcements to voters that would not reflect bias against parties.
How that will change the judicial-elections scene is not yet clear,
especially in those states in which the old traditions of quiet judicial
campaigns are still in place.
Candidates' announcements of their positions on issues will
occasionally raise the issue of whether the announcements constitute
implied pledges or promises as to how the candidate would rule on
matters related to abortions. In one case, the New York Commission
publicly admonished a judge who, while seeking political support from
the Right To Life Party, identified his strong anti-abortion beliefs; the
judge also was quoted in the press calling abortion "murder," which the
Commission stated could be construed as a position that the judge would
not comply with the law permitting abortions. 79 The anti-abortion
statements led to charges that the judge violated provisions that
prohibited making (i) "pledges or promises of conduct in office other
77. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002) (emphasis in original).
78. Id.
79. See In re La Cava, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 123 (2000) (Admonition) (Candidate sent a
letter to members of the Right-to-Life Party asserting his "commitment to the sanctity of life from
the moment of conception," his "strong moral opposition to the scourge of abortion" and his
"outrage" at the "continuation of the murderous and barbaric partial birth abortion procedure in this
state," and in an interview with a reporter, the judge said that abortion is murder, although he
advised the Commission that his statement was aimed at partial-birth abortion procedures). In 2002,
Judge La Cava, in the aftermath of the United States Supreme Court decision in White, asked the
Commission to vacate its admonition of him. See La Cava v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial
Conduct, 299 F. Supp. 2d 176, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The Commission denied his application, and
Judge La Cava brought an action in the United States District Court, Southern District, which
dismissed the action. See id. at 178-79. Although Judge La Cava sought to pursue the interesting
question whether his conduct is permitted by White as nothing more than an announcement of a
position on a disputed legal or political issue, the First Amendment issue was not reached since he
had consented to the admonition and failed to raise a First Amendment claim at the time. See id. at
180. What he said to the delegates to the Right-To-Life Party-in expressing his views on an
issue-may indeed be protected under the rationale of White, but calling abortion murder in a
campaign may be deemed to be bias against those who participate in the procedure, and, as the
Commission observed in admonishing the judge, suggests that he has difficulty recognizing the
legality of abortion. See In re La Cava, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 123, 124 (2000).
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than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office, 8 °
and (ii) "statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with
respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the
court.",8 1 Also charged and sustained were two general sections of the

rules requiring all judges to uphold the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary. 2
There is no rule in effect to prohibit an announcement of a
candidate's belief that abortions are murder unless the statement implies
that the candidate will not abide by the law or constitutes a pledge or
promise to take harsh action against the interests of those who have or
provide abortions. Whether a candidate's strong condemnation of
abortions can be prevented, especially in view of the state of the law
permitting abortion, is not clear at this point. But expressing a viewpoint
for or against abortions appears to be protected.
With the old order in flux, candidates will probably experiment, and
judicial conduct commissions should be receiving more complaints that
successful candidates for judicial office made implicit pledges or
promises during the election campaign or have committed themselves on
matters that are likely to come before their courts. Even well-intentioned
candidates will not know how far they and their opponents may go in the
exercise of their First Amendment rights.
POST- WHITE DECISIONS

In re Shanley (New York)
Just a few days after the United States Supreme Court decided
White, the New York Court of Appeals decided In re Shanley, 3 which
admonished Judge Shanley for overstating her educational background
in campaign circulars, but dismissed a charge that the judge had
improperly made a pledge or promise to voters when she described

80. N.Y. Rules § 100.5(A)(4)(d)(i).
81.

See id. § 100.5(A)(4)(d)(ii).

82.

See id. §§ 100.1, 100.2(A). A United States District Court enjoined the Commission from

enforcing the general rules as well as others pertaining to candidates' political activity, but the
injunction was stayed pending appeal of the District Court's decision. See Spargo v. N.Y. State
Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), stay denied, No. 1:02-CV1320, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7073 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2003), vacated by, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir.

2003). This decision is discussed below.
83.

774 N.E.2d 735 (N.Y. 2002).
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herself in campaign circulars as a "law and order candidate."' 4 The
court's view was not based on a First Amendment claim, since the judge
had not raised that issue, but on whether "law and order" constituted a
pledge or promise to decide cases with a prosecutorial bent. 85 The court
held that the Commission failed to show "that the phrase carries a
representation that compromises judicial impartiality. 'Law and order' is
a phrase widely and indiscriminately used in everyday parlance and
election campaigns. We decline to treat it8 6as a 'commit[ment]' or a
'pledge[] or promise[] of conduct in office."
The court's conclusion that "law and order candidate" is neither a
commitment or a pledge or promise of conduct in office points to the
likely prospect of many New York candidates using that term in the
future to describe themselves to voters, and, perhaps, using similar
terms. The possible trap for candidates who may start using the "law and
order" description is that combining "law and order candidate" with
other pro-police or pro-prosecution slogans could tip the balance to
being a violation of the rules against pledges or promises and
commitments to act in that manner. Clearly, the administration of justice
cannot tolerate candidates running as pro-prosecution judges, achieving
judgeships on that basis, and then either presiding over criminal cases or
being disqualified from such matters.
Weaver v. Bonner (Georgia)

A federal district court in Georgia struck down the provision of the
Georgia judicial conduct code that prohibited campaign speech that "the
candidate knows or reasonably should know is false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, or contains a material misrepresentation of fact or
law or omits a fact necessary to make the communication considered as
a whole not materially misleading or which is likely to create an
unjustified expectation about results the candidate can achieve." 87 The
court held that the provision was overbroad since it went beyond false
statements that are knowingly made. 88 A candidate for the Supreme
84. Id.at 736.
85. Seeid at 737.
86. Of course, "law and order" is used frequently, and the Commission tried to show in its
brief that it is uniformly used to mean pro-prosecution and pro-police, and when used by a judge to
describe himself or herself to voters, could reasonably be viewed as an implicit pledge or promise to
act in that manner.
87. Weaver v. Bonner, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1339 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
88. See id. at 1342.
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Court of Georgia had issued a brochure about the incumbent judge
stating that she "would require the State to license same-sex
marriages[J... has referred to traditional moral standards as 'pathetic
and disgraceful[,]... [and] has called the electric chair 'silly."' 8 9 The
challenger then aired a television advertisement that reiterated some of
the same points, and added that the incumbent had "questioned the
constitutionality of laws prohibiting sex with children under fourteen." 90
A special committee of the Georgia judicial conduct commission found
91
the statements to be unfair, false, and deceptive.
The challenger brought an action claiming that the special
committee publicly condemned the campaign statements without a
hearing, and the District Court for the Northern District dismissed his
claim while concluding that the rule against making false statements was
unconstitutionally broad.9 2 The court applied the "exacting scrutiny"
standard, holding that the rule can be upheld only if it is "narrowly
tailored to serve an overriding state interest." 93 The court held that since
the rule went beyond applying to statements knowingly made, in that it
applies as well to "(1) misleading, deceptive, and fraudulent statements,
(2) statements containing material misrepresentations of fact or law,
(3) statements that omit a fact necessary to make the communication
considered as a whole not materially misleading, and (4) statements
likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the candidate can
achieve," 94 and since it applies to these statements whether they are
made knowingly or negligently, it chills debate and therefore violates the
First Amendment.95
The United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit affirmed,
noting that under the broad reach of the rule, candidates may fear
addressing issues and "will too often remain silent even when they have
a good faith belief that what they would otherwise say is truthful. '96 The
court observed that "[n]egligent misstatements must be protected in
order to give protected speech the 'breathing space' it requires. 9 7 The
court disagreed with the contention that "speech by judicial candidates is
89. Id. at 1340.
90. Id.
91.
92.
93.

See id.
See id.at1341, 1346.
Id. at 1341-42.

94. Id.
at 42.
95.

See id.at 1342-43.

96. Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1320 (1 Ith Cir. 2002).
97.

Id.
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entitled to less protection than speech by legislative and executive
candidates."9 8 The court relied on White in holding that the United States
Supreme Court suggested that "the standard for judicial elections should99
be the same as the standard for legislative and executive elections."
The court added that
the distinction between judicial elections and other types of elections
has been greatly exaggerated, and we do not believe that the
distinction, if there truly is one, justifies greater restrictions on speech
during judicial campaigns than during other types of campaigns. We
therefore adopt the actual malice standard
l ° ...for regulations of

candidate speech during judicial campaigns. 0

Weaver v. Bonner went further than any other court in the country
in striking down restrictions, both in its decision and rationale. The court
held that a rule against judicial candidates directly soliciting funds was
unconstitutional, even though the issue had not been briefed and no
claim that it was unconstitutional had been made.' 0' Moreover, whereas
other courts that struck down the "announce" clause or other rules stated
that they were not deciding that judicial candidates had the same First
Amendment rights as candidates for other public offices, the circuit
have the same right
court's rationale was that judicial candidates did
02
under the First Amendment as other candidates. 1
In re Kinsey (Florida)
The Supreme Court of Florida, in In re Kinsey,' °3 imposed a postWhite public reprimand and a $50,000 fine on a judge who ran a pro-law
enforcement campaign for elective office. 10 4 The Florida Supreme Court
distinguished the "announce" clause from the "commit" clause, which is
applicable to Florida judges, and, in upholding its constitutionality
concluded that both the "pledges and promises" clause and the "commit"
clause serve a compelling state interest "in preserving the integrity of
our judiciary and maintaining the public's confidence in an impartial
judiciary."' 0 5 A candidate, said the court, should not be elected "by
98.
99.
100.
l10.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 1321
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1322.
See id. at 1321.
842 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 180 (Oct. 6, 2003) (mem.).
See Kinsey, 842 So. 2d at 92-93.
Id.at 87.
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promising to act in a partisan manner by favoring a discrete group or
class of citizens.' ' 6 Judge Kinsey had distributed campaign literature
that referred to herself as the unanimous choice of "Law Enforcement"
and stating that "police officers expect judges to take their testimony
seriously and to help law enforcement by putting criminals where they
belong ... behind bars."' 7 The literature showed a picture of the
candidate standing with "ten heavily armed police officers and was
captioned: "'Who do these guys count on to back them up?"' 10 8 In
another brochure, she offered the same message, including the "behind
bars!" message, and then declared: "Above all else, Pat Kinsey identifies
with the victims of crime."' 0 9 In another brochure she advised voters that
she believes, "We must support our hard-working law enforcement
officers by putting criminals behind bars, not back on our streets." ' 10
And in another flyer, she said she would "support our valiant law
enforcement officers ...not make their job harder .... [and] will bend
over backward to ensure that honest, law-abiding citizens are not
victimized a second time by the legal system that is supposed to protect
them."'11
In another brochure, entitled, "A Vital Message From Law
Enforcement," Judge Kinsey, describing several cases handled by Judge
Green, the incumbent judge who was her opponent in the election, and
who she identified as, "Let 'em Go' Green," criticized his bail decisions
and stated "victims have a right to expect judges
to protect them by
'
12
offenders."
dangerous
potentially
to
denying bond
In a radio interview, she compared her background as a prosecutor
with the incumbent's background as a defense attorney and indicated
that that is why he dismisses cases and fails to hold criminals
accountable." 3 She also accused him of permitting defendants to be
released on bond." 14 She added that "it was a judge's responsibility to be
'absolutely a reflection of what the community wants.""' 5 The Florida
Supreme Court concluded that the judge's campaign statements "gave

106.

Id.

107. Id. at 87-88 & n.8 (emphasis in original).
108. Id.at 87.
109. Id. at 88.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.

112.

Id. at 88, 90.

113.
114.

Seeid. at89.
Seeid. at91.

115.

Id. at 89.
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the misleading impression that a judge's role in criminal proceedings is
to combat crime and support police officers as opposed to being
an
16
impartial tribunal where justice is dispensed without favor or bias.","
Spargo v. Commission on JudicialConduct (New York)
Background"

17

Before he became a New York Supreme Court Justice, Thomas J.
Spargo was an election lawyer who also was a part-time town justice in
upstate New York." 8 As such, he was bound by the rules governing
judicial conduct, including a strict prohibition against political activity,
except limited activity on his own behalf when he was a candidate for
elective judicial office.'19 In November 1999, he was elected to the
position of town justice. 120 One year later, as the 2000 Presidential race
was in a deadlock, with litigation about to commence to determine
which national candidate would win the Presidency, Judge Spargo, at the
behest of the New York State Republican Party, went to Florida on
behalf of the Bush-Cheney campaign.' 2 1 In 2001, Town Justice Spargo
sought the nomination for the New York Supreme Court; he had the
nomination of the Republican Party, and hoped to obtain the
nominations on the Democratic Party and Independence Party22 lines,
which would assure him uncontested success in the next election.1
With respect to all three events-his reelection as town justice, his
work for the Republican Party in Florida, and his election to the New
York Supreme Court-issues emerged concerning his conduct, and the

116.

Id. at91.

117. The "facts" set forth here are taken from court filings in a lawsuit that Judge Spargo and
others have initiated in federal court against the Commission, the Commission's Chair, and the
author of this article, as Administrator of the Commission. New York is one of fifteen states that has
closed proceedings while charges are pending. By bringing the lawsuit, Judge Spargo implicitly
waived confidentiality as to any materials, including the charges against him, that are part of the
court record. At the time the lawsuit was commenced, charges had been filed but no formal hearing
had been held and no determination had been rendered as to the facts or as to whether the judge's
conduct was improper.
118. See Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72, 74 (N.D.N.Y.
2003).
119. See N.Y. Rules § 100.5(A)(2) (2001).
120. See Spargo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 74.
121. See id. at 80.
122. Seeid. at 74.
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Commission on Judicial Conduct commenced 23an investigation and
eventually filed disciplinary charges against him. 1
Alleged Facts: Pending Charges
While campaigning for reelection for town justice, Judge Spargo, in
an effort to introduce himself to potential voters, distributed his business
card and coupons that he had purchased that were redeemable for free
doughnuts and coffee; 124 on another occasion, Judge Spargo distributed
coupons, which he had purchased, that were redeemable for $5 for
gasoline, to the first five motorists who drove up to a convenience storeservice station; 125 he also went to a local restaurant and purchased a
round of drinks for everyone at the bar; 126 on several occasions at the
town dump, he distributed fifty half-gallons of cider and doughnuts to
town residents who were present; 12 and on several other occasions, he
purchased and delivered pizzas for teachers, highway employees, town
employees, and private citizens. 128 The total value of the food and
coupons was approximately $2,000.129
In 2001, seeking the endorsements for supreme court nominations
of the Democratic and Independence parties, Judge Spargo allegedly
authorized a $5,000 payment to a delegate to the Democratic Party
Judicial Nominating Convention who had nominated him to be the
Democratic Party candidate and a $5,000 payment to a delegate to the
Independence Party Judicial Nominating Convention; both delegates' had
provided assistance to Judge Spargo's campaign. 130 The Democratic
Party delegate had provided voluntary services, had no expectation of
being paid for her services, and did not ask to be paid; 3' the
Independence Party delegate had no firm agreement with the Spargo
campaign that he would be paid for his services. 132 The Spargo
campaign reported the payments in filings with the State Election Board,
and as to the date when the Democratic Party delegate earned her $5,000
123.

See id at 79-81.

124.

See id. at 79.

125.
126.

See id.
See id.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 81.
See id.
See id.
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fee, Judge Spargo's campaign gave the date of the convention.' 33 If the
payments were for the delegates' assistance in obtaining the respective
nominations, the conduct would violate state law. 134 Even if state law
were not violated, the conduct might still convey the appearance that the
payments were to assist in obtaining the nominations, which would also
constitute serious judicial misconduct. Or, the Commission might
conclude, based on the testimony to be taken at the hearing, that the
payments had nothing to do with the nominations.
As a part-time judge, Spargo was not permitted to engage in
political activity on behalf of any other candidate or political party. Yet
as a lawyer who specialized in election law he provided legal services to
candidates. He also provided services of a different kind to the national
Republican Party following the vote for President of the United States in
2000. While attending the recount of votes in Miami-Dade County,
Broward County and Palm Beach, Florida, and with the apparent aim of
disrupting the recount process at the offices of the Miami-Dade County
Board of Elections, he allegedly participated in a loud, obstructive
demonstration against the recount process.' 35 Moreover, he received
national attention for having engaged in the demonstration when he
testified as a witness in the ensuing litigation, where he described his
36
conduct as "chanting."'
As an election lawyer, Judge Spargo represented the candidate for
Albany County District Attorney in the fall of 2000.'
The District
Attorney's office regularly appears in Judge Spargo's town court, which
is in Albany County. 13 Judge Spargo's client was successful and owed
Judge Spargo $10,000 for his legal fee, a debt reported in the new
District Attorney's filings with the Board of Elections.' 39 As the charges
allege, Judge Spargo presided over many criminal cases in the following
several months in which the District Attorney's office appeared, while
the District Attorney's campaign owed Judge Spargo $10,000 for his
legal fee in connection with the election; 140 moreover, the judge
allegedly failed to make disclosure of the potential conflict in every case,

133. See id.
134. See N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 17-158(3) (McKinney 1998).
135. See Spargo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 80.
136. See David Firestone, Gore and Bush Lawyers Close Arguments Over Florida Tally, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 4, 2000, at Al.
137. SeeSpargo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 80.
138. See id.

139. See id.
140.

See id.
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and made
no effort to obtain consent from the defense for him to
14 1
preside.
Prior to making an official announcement as a candidate for
nomination to supreme court, in May 2001, Judge Spargo gave the
keynote address at a Monroe County Conservative Party's annual fundraiser. 142 Judges may not at any time be featured speakers at political
fund-raisers and may not attend political functions except during a
143
defined window period in connection with their own campaigns.
Monroe County (Rochester, New York) is approximately 225 driving
miles west of Albany County where Judge Spargo intended to run for
judicial office.
The Litigation Initiated by Judge Spargo
The Spargo litigation on First Amendment grounds was
commenced in the United States District Court, Northern District of
New York. 144 In order to reach its decision on the merits, the district
court had to establish federal jurisdiction, which it did by reasoning that
the New York State Court of Appeals had neither the legal basis nor the
inclination to decide issues of constitutional law, and, further, that if
Judge Spargo were removed from office, it is not clear whether the New
45
York State Court of Appeals could decide not to review the matter.
The district court judge was mistaken in both respects, 46 and made
additional flawed findings as well. 147 The court concluded that because

141. See id.
142. See id. at 80-81.
143. See N.Y. Rules § 100.5(A)(1), (2) (2001).
144. See Spargo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 75.
145. See id. at 83-85.
146. Although it had been clear that the Court of Appeals had no discretion to deny a
disciplined judge the right to a review, and, in fact, heard all seventy-nine cases in which judges
sought review from Commission determinations, the Court of Appeals made that crystal clear in two
recent decisions-apparently in response to the United States District Court's doubts. See In re
Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 4 (N.Y. 2003) and In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1289 (N.Y. 2003). The
court in Raab stated: "The determination is reviewable as of right, and petitioner now seeks that
review." Id. at 1289.
147. Curiously, the district court stated that "the record of the Commission is made in the
course of its investigation." Spargo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 84. The New York Court of Appeals reviews
post-charge hearing records, not investigative records. The district court mistakenly added:
Any hearing is not a trial, and rules of evidence do not apply. The resultant record would
necessarily be spare, less than ideal for consideration of a constitutional question of
import not only statewide but nationwide as well. Additionally, where, as here, the
constitutional challenges are summarily rejected or ignored, without analysis or
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only the federal courts could do justice to such constitutional challenges
as the one before it, it had jurisdiction to rule on the case and avoid the
abstention doctrine. 148 The district court accepted jurisdiction, upheld
Judge Spargo's position on the law, struck down the challenged rules,
and granted a permanent injunction against the use of such rules in any
other case. 149 The court also enjoined use in any case of the general rules
that are charged in all formal complaints. 50 The effect of the court's
decision was profound.
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stayed the
injunction, and after hearing the appeal, the court vacated the injunction
and reversed the lower court's decision as to the rules applicable to New
York's state judges.' 5 1 The court observed that since the time of the
district court's decision the New York State Court of Appeals
specifically observed that a judge may seek review as a matter of right
and the court would review the Commission's determination.' 52 The
Second Circuit held that the federal courts are prohibited by the
abstention doctrine from making decisions on issues that should first be
fully considered in the state system. 153 The disciplinary matter is pending
before the Commission. The New York State Court of Appeals would
hear any determination adverse to Judge Spargo, on Judge Spargo's
application. On September 1, 2004, Judge Spargo filed a petition in
Albany County Supreme Court to enjoin the Commission from
proceeding with a hearing on the charges against him, including that he
solicited donations to a defense fund from attorneys who practice before

discussion... review of the constitutional questions would be impossible because of the
scant record.
Id. (citations omitted). Ironically, the district court rendered a decision on the skimpiest of
records since the disciplinary hearing in Matter of Spargo had not been held, and the court
decided the complex issues presented without holding a factual hearing, choosing instead to
rely on affidavits. One such affidavit claimed that in In re Shanley, supra note 76, neither the
Commission nor the State Court of Appeals considered a First Amendment claim raised by
Judge Shanley. The district court judge relied on that inaccurate affidavit and reasoned that it
provided proof of the reluctance of the State Court of Appeals to consider First Amendment
issues. In fact, no First Amendment claim had been raised in Shanley. See id at 84-85.
148. See id.
at 91.
149.

See id.at 91-92.

150.
151.
152.
153.

See id. at 92.
See Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 2003).
See id.
See id. at 74-75.
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him. Judge54Spargo denied the allegation that he personally solicited
donations. 1

One prior relevant decision of the Commission on Judicial Conduct
is In re Therrian,155 in which a non-lawyer, town justice was removed
from office for distributing $5 bills to prospective voters to cover the
cost of their expenses to go to the polls. 156 The Commission concluded

that those payments were to induce voters to vote for a particular
candidate and hence were wrong under both the Election Law and the
rules applicable then to the conduct of campaigns. 57 When a candidate
distributes $5 bills to voters and introduces himself or herself as a
candidate, it may be impossible to avoid the appearance of vote-buying;
and in the absence of proof needed in criminal proceedings, a judge
should not engage in the appearance of impropriety.
In re Watson (New York)
William J. Watson, an assistant district attorney in Niagara County,
New York, decided to run for the office of city judge, Lockport, New
York. 158 As a self-described "tough" prosecutor, he told the voters that
they had a real choice between himself and the two incumbent judges,
one the Lockport City court judge and the other the acting judge who
was also a candidate. 159 The candidates ran against each other for
nominations in five primaries. 160 Obviously, the winner of the major
party primaries would win the subsequent election, so Mr. Watson
adopted a tough-on-crime platform' 61 and set out to win all of the
primaries. His campaign was effective and smart; he gave the public
what the public usually wants to hear-a judicial candidate who finally
would give voters assurances about how he would handle criminal cases.
That platform was the thrust of his entire campaign.

154. See In re Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, Pet. Index No. 2004-5336,
Doc. No. 9325147 (Sup. Ct., Albany Co., N.Y. Sept. 1,2004).
155. N.Y. COMM'NANN. REP. 141 (1987).
156. Seeid. at142.
157. See id.
158. See In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 2 (N.Y. 2003). Watson advised the Commission on
Judicial Conduct that he decided to run for office because the Police Department and the court were

not cooperating. Brief for Respondent at *9, In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d I (N.Y. 2003) (No. 78),
available at 2003 WL 22299491.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
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The local press had recently reported that because of new police62
techniques, the number of arrests in several categories had increased.
Feeding on that major story, Watson linked the increase of arrests with
rising crime. 63 The logic seemed obvious: more arrests must mean more
crime,' 64 and the public would be told that one candidate, a "Real
Prosecutor," could do something about the problem. He reiterated the
"arrests" theme, converted questions asked by the press to his anti-crime
theme, and advertised among police department personnel that they
should tell their friends, neighbors and relatives to "Put a Real
Prosecutor on The Bench," one who would work with the police to clean
up the city's streets.' 65 The story he told the public was that because of
the decisions being made by the incumbent judges-and he referred
criminals from other
specifically to bail and sentencing decisions166--municipalities had decided that Lockport was the place to visit to
commit their crimes, and the implication was they were telling each
other about Lockport. 167 Only one candidate could or would stop this
vicious cycle: he described himself as the "real prosecutor" among the
for those who were
candidates. 68 He would make it "unattractive"
69
"flocking" to the city from other areas. 1
Although there is no practical way to measure the actual effect of
his campaign on the voters, other than his success in all of the primaries
except the Liberal Party primary, it is not far-fetched to believe that his
campaign would be seen as a refreshing change from the dull judicial
campaigns the voters were used to. Here was a judicial candidate who
told the voters what they wanted to hear: as the next judge, he would use
the tools at hand, including the decisions to set bail and render sentences
in misdemeanor cases, to stop the intolerable increase in arrests! The

162. Seeidat*18.
163. Seeid.
164. See id.at *15. Of course, it is totally illogical, especially by an experienced prosecutor

who would be expected to know that arrests can increase without a corresponding increase in crime.
In fact, even if crime remains constant, the public should want arrests to increase if it means solving
a higher percentage of the crimes that occurred.
165. See id. at *15-*16. He also said that the court "should not be a revolving door, where
criminals are caught and released day after day," and he urged voters to "put an end to this now." Id.
166. See id. at *10-* I1. Ironically, he maintained at the hearing that his real purpose was to set
forth administrative changes he would implement, but he believed he was ethically obligated not to
address those concems-the kind of speech that would be protected. See id. at * I I.
167. See id. at * 10. The factual basis he had for the statement that criminals were "flocking" to
the city was that it was "generally known." See id. at * 15.
168.
169.

Seeid.at*15.
See id.
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police believed that arrests had increased because they were more
efficient and had deployed their resources better than they had in the
past, but candidate Watson told the voters that the increase in the
carefully selected crime categories revealed a serious problem to their
health and safety. Of the categories in which arrests either declined or
remained the same, including rape, driving while intoxicated and grand
larceny, candidate Watson decided not to refer to them at all. 70 Did he
win the election? Of course he won, and so would many other
challengers if they could run such unethical campaigns, especially when
the incumbents follow the existing rules.
Watson's successful primary campaigns adversely affected the
integrity of the judiciary by assuring the voters time and again that the
two incumbent judges should be held responsible for an increase in
arrests in certain crime categories (carefully selected by candidate
Watson) and, implicitly, that if he were elected, he could reverse that
course. Yet, at the disciplinary hearing he acknowledged that arrests can
of
increase for numerous reasons completely unrelated to the operation
17
'
training.
better
and
police
the
for
funding
better
the courts, including
Because his campaign attributed the increase of arrests to the
conduct of the incumbents, and because he implied to the public that
arrests were indicative of an increase in crime, Watson was charged with
violating the rule that a candidate for judicial office should not
"knowingly make any false statement or misrepresent the identity,
qualifications, current position or other fact concerning the candidate or
an opponent. ' 72 In censuring Judge Watson, the Court of Appeals
decided that his campaign had made improper pledges and promises, but
it was unnecessary to determine whether he violated the other charged
3

7
provisions of the rules. 1

Most importantly, the court held: "New York's pledges or promises
clause-essential to maintaining impartiality and the appearance of
impartiality in the state judiciary-is sufficiently circumscribed to
withstand exacting scrutiny under the First Amendment."' 74 The court
noted that the "pledges and promises" rule is not a blanket ban on
pledges or promises since a judicial candidate "may promise future

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See id. at* 19.
See id.
N.Y. Rules § 100.5(A)(4)(d)(iii); In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 2 (N.Y. 2003).
See Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 4, 8.
Id.
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conduct provided such conduct is not inconsistent with the faithful and
impartial performance of judicial duties. 175
The court observed that the State has set forth two compelling
interests in support of the pledges or promises rule, "both related to the
preservation of impartiality and the appearance of impartiality in the
judicial branch."'' 76 The court noted that both the Commission and the
Attorney General in an amicus brief had contended "that the rule
promotes the State's interest in preventing party bias and the appearance
of bias, as well as furthering openmindedness

...

in the state

judiciary.' ' 177 The court observed that Judge Watson "does not dispute
1
that such interests are compelling-nor could he reasonably do SO.,, 78
The court rejected the Judicial Conduct Commission's
determination that the judge be removed from office; 179 in New York, a
determination for public discipline is subject to review by the Court of
Appeals at the judge's request. 180 The Commission's theory was that the
judge had achieved his judgeship by running an improper campaign, and
he should be denied the fruits of his misconduct. 18' The Commission had
stated:
Respondent's intentionally misleading use of arrest statistics and his
intentional effort to blame the incumbents for an increase in crime...
demonstrate that he is unfit to serve as a judge. Moreover, to allow
respondent to retain his judgeship would be to reward him for
intentional misconduct and might encourage other judicial candidates,
knowing that they may reap the fruits8 of
their misconduct, to ignore the
2
rules applicable to judicial elections.1

175. Id. at 6. This is a particularly important interpretation of the rule, which bars pledges or
promises "other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office." N.Y. Rules
§ 100.5(A)(4)(d)(i). The judge's position that the rule as written permits only a statement that the
candidate will carry out the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of judicial office was
rejected by the court. See Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 7.
176. Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 6.
177. Id. This observation appears to be in response to the rationale used by Justice Scalia in the
White decision. See id. at 5. The New York State Court of Appeals has identified two strong
compelling interests to justify the "pledges or promises" rule. Interestingly, the Court left open the
question whether the test to determine constitutionality had to be "exacting scrutiny," the strictest of
the tests and the one most likely to lead to a conclusion that a rule is unconstitutional. The Court
said that it "need not decide the question" in this case, since the rule is constitutional even under an
exacting scrutiny test. Id. at 6.
178. Id. at 6.
179. See id. at 8.
180. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 22(a).
181. See In re Watson, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 196 (2003).
182. Id.
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The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the judge has not
"irredeemably damaged public confidence in his own impartiality or that
of the state judiciary as a whole."'' 83 The court noted that the judge
expressed remorse for his campaign conduct and that there was no
indication84 that he acted inappropriately on the bench following his
election.
If campaigns like the ones Judge Watson and Judge Kinsey (in
Florida) ran are as certain to elevate a candidate's chances as it appears
they are, why would a candidate in the future not tell the public what it
may want to hear, get elected, and then deal with the judicial conduct
commission on misconduct allegations? The Court of Appeals
apparently considered this problem and stated in Watson that removal
might be a possibility in future cases. 8'
The court addressed squarely the issue raised by the judge whether
his statements could be construed as pledges or promises in the absence
of his advising the voters that he pledged or promised to take action
consistent with his campaign rhetoric. Expressing a "viewpoint" is
proper, said the court, if it does not constitute a promise of future
conduct.' 8 6 The court made the important observation that a candidate
could violate the rule against making pledges or promises without
explicitly promising to take action.'8 7 "A candidate's statements must be
reviewed in their totality and in the context of the campaign as a whole
to determine whether the candidate has unequivocally articulated a
pledge or promise of future conduct or decisionmaking that
the faithful and impartial performance of judicial
compromises
88
duties."'
In determining whether the comments had been pledges or
promises, the court considered the totality of the judge's remarks as a
candidate. 8 9 The State's compelling interest for the rules is "preventing
actual or apparent party bias and promoting open-mindedness because it
prohibits a judicial candidate from making promises that compromise
the candidate's ability to behave impartially, or to be perceived as

183.
184.
185.

Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 8.
See id.
See id. The court warned: "[Ojur decision in this case should not be interpreted to suggest

that violation of the campaign rules can never rise to a level warranting removal." Id.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See id. at 4.
See id
Id.
See id. at 5.
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unbiased and open-minded by the public, once on the bench."' 90 Even
unkept promises "damage the judicial system because the newly elected
judge will have created a perception that will be difficult to dispel in the
public mind."' 9' Litigants and lawyers should not have to be concerned
that the judge's earlier campaign statements will prevent the judge from
19 2
considering the issues with an open mind, said the court.
The court stated that campaign pledges also miseducate voters
about the role of the judiciary. "Judges must apply the law faithfully and
impartially-they are not elected to aid particular groups, be it the
police, the prosecution or the defense bar. Campaign promises that
suggest otherwise gravely risk distorting public perception of the judicial
role."1

93

The court distinguished its decision in Shanley (pertaining to use of
the term "law and order candidate," which it said was not a pledge or
promise) to make it clear that the "pledges and promises" rule should not
be used to limit statements that do not constitute actual pledges or
promises. "The rule precludes only those statements of intention that
single out a party or class of litigants for special treatment, be it
favorable or unfavorable, or convey that the candidate will behave in a
manner inconsistent with the faithful and impartial performance of
' 94
judicial duties if elected."'
In re Raab (New York)
Ira J. Raab was a district court judge who ran for supreme court in
95
November 2000 after getting the nomination of the Democratic Party.'
196
Five years earlier, he had run on the Democratic Party line and lost.
After obtaining the Democratic Party nomination at that time, he paid
the county Democratic Party $10,000 to cover the Party's expenses in
promoting its candidates. 197 Such payments are improper because they
do not constitute reimbursement for expenses incurred for that

190.

ld. at 7.

191.
192.

Id.
See id.

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id.
See In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1288-89 (N.Y. 2003).
Seeid. at 1288.
See id.
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candidate's own campaign.1 98 They constitute contributions by judges,
which are prohibited.' 99
In the spring of 2000, before his nomination, but during a period
when he could be considered to be a candidate, he participated in a
screening meeting of candidates who were seeking the nomination of a
minor political party for judicial and non-judicial office.2 °0 It was
unclear from the record why he was even present, and the evidence was
that he asked each candidate whether they would publicize the party's
endorsement on their campaign literature. 20 ' His reason for doing so was
that if he later obtained the nomination of that party, he would be helped
by any publicity the other candidates gave to the party. Although there is
some logic to that position, he should not have been present and
certainly should not have participated in the interviews. His question to
each candidate is the kind of question that a political boss would ask in
an effort to obtain a pledge to advertise the party's backing of the
candidate.
In March 2000, during a special election to fill a vacancy in the
county legislature, the minor political party, whose nomination Judge
Raab coveted, operated a telephone bank on behalf of a candidate
endorsed by that party.20 2 Those on the phone bank called registered
20 3
voters to ask them to vote for the candidate in the special election.
Judge Raab made calls for the candidate for approximately one hour.20 4
Judge Raab's conduct constituted political activity on20behalf
of another
5
candidate and was specifically prohibited by the rules.
Judge Raab made no improper campaign speeches, and funded his
own campaign because he believed it was inappropriate to seek financial
support from attorneys who would appear before him.20 6 The
Commission censured Judge Raab for both his improper
political
20 7
activity and a single incident of extreme rudeness as a judge.
Judge Raab had argued before the Court of Appeals that the charges
pertaining to his political activity violated the First Amendment because
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Seeid. at 1288, 1293.
See id.
See id. at 1288.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See In re Raab, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 143 (2004).
See Raab, 793 N.E.2d at 1288, 1292.
See In re Raab, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 143 (2004).
See Raab, 793 N.E.2dat 1289, 1293.
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the rules "are not sufficiently narrow in scope to serve a compelling state
objective and therefore do not withstand strict scrutiny analysis. 20 8
Rejecting that argument, the court found that the rules were narrowly
tailored to further compelling State interests, "including preserving the
impartiality and independence of our state judiciary20 9and maintaining
public confidence in New York State's court system.,
Commenting further on the need for rules restricting payments of
money to political parties, the court noted that prohibiting candidates'
contributions to political parties ensures that political parties cannot
"extract" payments from potential nominees "inexchange for a party
endorsement. ' ' 2 1 It prevents candidates from trying "to buy" and
political parties from trying "to sell" judicial office, and it "diminishes
the likelihood" that such payments would be perceived by the public as
being the purchase of a judgeship. 21 1 "Needless to say, the State's
interest in ensuring that judgeships are not-and do not appear to be'for sale' is beyond compelling. The public would justifiably lose
confidence in the court system were it otherwise2 12and, without public

confidence, the judicial branch could not function."
Because Judge Raab gave the political party that endorsed him the
sum of $10,000, "in the absence of proof of the nature and amount of the
specific expenditures," the payment "amounted to an improper
contribution. 21 3 The court applied the exacting scrutiny test without
holding that in all such cases that test had to be applied:
In sum, sections 100.5(A)(1) and 100.5(A) (1)(c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and
(h) survive petitioner's constitutional challenge because they are
narrowly constructed to address the interests at stake, including the
State's compelling interest in preventing political bias or corruption, or
the appearance of political bias or corruption, in its judiciary.

In re Farrell(New York)
In 1999, Mark G. Farrell, a town justice, was a candidate for
nomination by the Erie County Democratic Party for state Supreme

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 1290.
Id.
Id.at 1292.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1293.
Id.
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During his campaign, he made a financial contribution to the
Erie County Democratic Committee and, at the request of the Chairman
of the Erie County Democratic Committee, he made telephone calls to
members of his town's Democratic Committee to solicit support for the
Chairman's reelection. Controlled on the law by the Court of Appeals
decision in Raab, Judge Farrell agreed with the decision that he should
be publicly disciplined.
Surprisingly, three members of the judicial conduct commission
joined in a concurring opinion that criticized the decision in Raab and
predicted that the section of the rules applicable to political activity will
be struck down by "a federal court." The thrust of the opinion is that
although New York should appoint judges and keep them removed from
politics, selecting judges by election means that candidates have the
right under the First Amendment to engage in political activity,
including making political contributions and soliciting votes for other
candidates. Adopting the rationale in White, the concurring members
stated that only conduct that shows bias against future parties would
justify a restriction on campaign conduct. They were constrained to
concur in recognition of the state's high court's decision in Raab.
Applying White, which concerns campaign oratory, to a candidate's
political activity such as making political contributions and soliciting
votes for a political leader is interesting although controversial.
Court.

CONCLUSION

Too Much Free Speech Can Be Detrimental
to the Administration ofJustice
Although the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Weaver v.
Bonner extended White in striking down traditional restrictions on
judicial campaigns,2 16 both Judge Raab and Judge Watson failed to
convince the New York State Court of Appeals that White should be
extended beyond its narrow holding. Judge Spargo had no difficulty in
convincing the federal district court in northern New York to extend
White, even to the point of striking down several key rules that control
judicial candidates' conduct during elections, having nothing to do with

215. See In re Farrell, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. (forthcoming 2005), available at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/F/farrell.htm.
216. See Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322-23 (11 th Cir. 2002).
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the contents of their speech. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, but not on the merits.
Time will tell whether either the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
or the United States Supreme Court will disagree with the New York
State Court of Appeals on the principles set forth in Watson and Raab.
The Supreme Court recently had a prime opportunity in the Florida
Kinsey case to extend White to2 cover pledges and promises to be tough
on crime, but declined to do So. 17
With respect to campaign rhetoric and campaign discussion of
disputed legal and political issues, traditional campaigns for judicial
office could change dramatically in the near future as candidates realize
that they can express their views of the law. It is possible that
candidates' expressions of their personal views will be benign, the voters
will learn more about the candidates, and no damage will be done to the
administration of justice or to the independence of the judiciary. More
likely, there will be some questionable statements and possibly others
that go over the line.
Considering the campaign statements in some of the cases that led
to the court challenges of existing rules, campaign rhetoric that appeals
for votes could raise serious questions about the impartiality of the
judiciary and could do great damage to parties' right to due process of
law. If Judges Chmura and Weaver can avoid being disciplined for their
respective conduct, for example, there is nothing that prevents any
candidate in Michigan and Georgia, unless new rules are devised, from
unfairly attacking incumbent judges and damaging the rights of classes
of parties whose interests are addressed in such statements. And unless
campaign conduct of the kind engaged in by Judges Watson and Kinsey
results in removal from office, candidates are certain to take the risk of
public discipline to achieve a judgeship. They may well conclude that it
is a risk worth taking, and anti-crime slogans that suggest pro-police and
pro-prosecution bias should attract votes.21 8
217. See Kinsey v. Fla. Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, 124 S. Ct. 180 (2003) (denying
petition for writ of certiorari); see also supratext accompanying notes 103-116.
218. One commentator argues for no discipline under any circumstances for campaign speech,
including pledges and promises of specific rulings. See Alan B. Morrison, The Judge Has No
Robes: Keeping the Electorate in the Dark About What Judges Think About the Issues, 36 IND. L.

REv. 719 (2003). Arguing against disciplining judges for such misconduct, Mr. Morrison notes:
We are, after all, not dealing with someone charged with inflicting either physical or
financial harm on anyone else. At worst, the candidate will have said something that
might be seen as pledging to decide a case in a particular way, for which there is the
existing remedy of recusal should that situation ever arise.
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If judicial elections were to resemble elections for other public
offices, the judiciary would eventually consist of judges who promised
to trample the rights of minorities and unpopular parties, which would
both change the face of elections and diminish the quality of the
judiciary.
Another casualty of expanded free speech in judicial elections will
be the defeat of incumbent judges for rendering unpopular, but correct,

decisions. Although some commentators optimistically rely on voters'
sound judgment, the success of some candidates who based their

campaigns on assuring voters of their bias for law enforcement justifies
the view expressed here that more is needed than blind faith in the

electorate. A campaign is not the right forum to educate voters on the
overriding need to safeguard the independence and impartiality of the
judiciary. The stakes are too great.
Another Restriction Is Needed
That Appears to Meet the Standards of White
To keep the system free of these abuses, more than the rule against
"pledges and promises" is needed.2 19 In New York, judges can now run

Id. at 741. One can logically come to that conclusion by minimizing the harm resulting from such
conduct. The harm to the administration of justice and to parties' due process rights may be more
substantial than inflicting physical or financial harm on a party. Additionally, recusal often will not
be an adequate remedy when the candidate-judge has pledged to take tough action against an entire
class of parties, such as defendants in criminal proceedings. Nor does recusal deal with the problem
of a candidate who runs on a "tough on crime" platform but who is not apt to preside over criminal
cases. Judges should maintain the independence and impartiality of the judiciary by avoiding such
conduct, and if they fail in that obligation, they should face disciplinary measures that are
commensurate with the damage their campaign rhetoric has inflicted.
219. In August 2003, the American Bar Association amended the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct in response to White. In many states, including New York, candidates are not permitted to
make pledges or promises of future action (other than faithful and impartial performance of duties)
or make statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to matters that are
likely to come before the court. Under the changes adopted by the American Bar Association, which
constitute recommendations to the states, pledges, promises and commitments that are inconsistent
with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office would be improper if
they are made "with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the
court ....

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3) (1990) (amended 2003). One

apparent effect of the changes is to make pledges and promises subject to discipline only if they
relate to matters that are likely to come before the candidate's court. That would make it difficult,
perhaps impossible, to discipline a judge seeking a civil court position for making pledges or
promises to take harsh action against defendants in criminal proceedings. Judges running for civil
positions would probably get favorable voter attention by campaigning against crime. See supra
notes 8-9 and accompanying text. Thus, one effect of the change in the Model Code might be to
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as "law and order candidates" as long as other campaign statements do
not amplify that description to the point of it becoming a "pledge or
promise." It appears likely that similar statements of tough-judge
philosophy will be used in campaign literature and in television ads.
That may not be a good development.
The "pledges or promises" rule may be inadequate for campaign
language that suggests, but does not specifically state, how the candidate
will rule on cases. Only the strongest suggestions may be subject to
discipline as a pledge or promise. The majority opinion in White
discussed a hypothetical situation raised in Justice Stevens' dissenting
opinion of an appellate judge who, in a reelection campaign, states that
220
he or she has an "unbroken record of affirming rape convictions.
Would the rules proscribe such a truthful but biased campaign
statement? If the statement is considered a pledge or promise to continue
that streak, it could be the basis for a disciplinary sanction. If it is not a
pledge or promise, it would be permitted under the rules notwithstanding
its biased undertones. Justice Scalia stated that the biased comment
could not be covered by a rule such as the "announce" clause because
221
the "announce" clause covers so much more.
Justice Scalia's response to Justice Stevens' hypothetical opens the
door to the promulgation of a narrowly-tailored rule against campaign
speech that reflects bias against a party or parties. There is a wide gap
between announcing views on issues and making pledges or promisesone that needs to be filled. Protecting the independence and impartiality
of the judiciary requires more than the rule against "pledges or
promises" since, in appealing for votes, candidates might make biased
comments-that would not constitute pledges or promises-against a
class of individuals who appear in that court. The rules governing the
conduct of judicial candidates should prohibit campaign statements that
reflect bias against a party or parties who come before the courts.
Biased statements about parties or about issues that directly
prejudice parties should be prohibited even when such campaign
statements do not constitute "pledges or promises" of future conduct.
Bias against parties may be implied pledges or promises to rule against
those parties, and that should be a sufficient basis to make the conduct
subject to discipline. A narrowly tailored rule against such campaign
reward misrepresentation. Judicial candidates should not promise to decide cases against unpopular
parties regardless of whether they will be in position to do so.
220. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 777 n.7 (2002).
221. See id. at 770, 776-77.
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statements should pass the exacting scrutiny test based on Justice
Scalia's rationale on behalf of the majority in White.
Another Solution
There is a long-term solution as well. In her concurring opinion in
White, Justice O'Connor expressed why "the very practice of electing
judges" undermines the governmental interests in an impartial and
independent judiciary. 222 As Justice O'Connor said, judges facing
elections "are likely to feel that they have at least some personal stake in
the outcome of every publicized case. Elected judges cannot help being
aware that if the public is not satisfied with the outcome of a particular
case, it could hurt their reelection prospects. ' 23
Justice O'Connor acknowledged statistics indicating that judges
facing election are more likely than others to overrule a jury's verdict of
life imprisonment and impose the death penalty.224 Campaign financing
is an additional serious problem as judicial candidates rely on the
financial contributions of lawyers who will be appearing before them if
they are successful. Justice O'Connor cited recent judicial elections
where more than one million dollars was expended on individual
campaigns. 225 Justice O'Connor added that "relying on campaign
donations may leave judges feeling indebted to certain parties or interest
groups... [and] the mere possibility that judges' decisions may be
motivated by the desire to repay campaign contributors is likely to
undermine the public's confidence in the judiciary., 226 Because of
concerns raised at the turn of the twentieth century, "some States
adopted a modified system of judicial selection that became known as
the Missouri Plan., 227 Judges are appointed by a chief executive from a
short list of nominees put together by a nonpartisan nominating
commission, and the judges "then subsequently stand for unopposed
retention elections in which voters are asked whether the judges should
8
be recalled.,

22

Justice O'Connor noted that the Missouri Plan "reduces threats to
judicial impartiality, even if it does not eliminate all popular pressure on
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 788.
Id. at 788-89.
Id. at 789.
See id. at 790.
Id.
Id.at 791.
Id.
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judges. 2 29 Indeed it does not eliminate the possibility that judges would
be punished in recall elections for rendering unpopular decisions. Nor
does it eliminate politics entirely, since governors and mayors are part of
the political process and would still be influenced by the political
support that the candidates for appointment muster. But pandering for
votes would be eliminated; raising funds for campaign expenses would
be eliminated; and the person making the appointments, from a list of
candidates screened and nominated by a nonpartisan panel representing
a cross section of the community, would be an elected official who is
responsible to the voters for his or her choices. Most importantly, there
is a far greater chance under the Missouri Plan (or "merit selection" as it
is also called) for qualified applicants who lack political influence to be
considered than under a partisan elective system. The Missouri Plan
would not be perfect, but it is better than having partisan elections, in
which political leaders exercise the power to designate judges. In some
jurisdictions, designation as the nominee of a particular party assures
victory. Where a political party or party chief decides who gets elected,
the public's power to elect their judges is illusory. Moreover, too often,
political leaders who wield enormous influence over who become judges
do not choose candidates for the best of motives.
As more candidates for the judiciary demonstrate their charisma by
announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues, and as
voters choose judges based on discussions of those issues, due process
of law will be sacrificed. In the final analysis, when expanded freespeech rights adversely affect the administration of justice, and the trend
is in that direction, it is likely that greater consideration will be given to
reforming the system
of selecting judges, which makes sense for other
2 30
reasons as well.

229. Id.
230. There is a better way to select judges. The argument that many fine judges have emerged

through the political system (i.e. elections), while true, is misplaced since these same judges would
emerge if judges were appointed as part of a merit selection system. The election of judges as part
of a partisan political system places far too much power in the hands of political leaders in choosing

judges and limits judgeships only to those who have chosen to engage in party politics and
succeeded in that regard. Thus, in states like New York, where most judges are elected in partisan

elections, with some exceptions, lawyers who would be fine judges are essentially ineligible if they
have not taken an active role in party politics, or chose to do so with the party not in power. Since
campaigning must be restricted to ensure that parties are afforded due process of law, which is the
subject of this article, campaigns for elected judicial office fail to give guidance to voters to make

their votes meaningful.
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